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Forfeitures-Due

ProcesS-SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS FORFEITURE

OF INNOCENT OWNER'S

PROPERTY WITHOUT

PRIOR

NOTICE

AND

HEARING

Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)
It is a fundamental notion of justice that the guilty, and only
the guilty, should be punished.' The same law which disciplines the
wrongdoer protects the innocent. Indeed, any system which would
punish the blameless, even to protect society as a whole, would not
only be considered unfair, but morally objectionable as well. 2 Yet
present-day forfeiture statutes, 3 which authorize governments to
confiscate property used in the commission of a crime, permit
society to inflict harsh punishment upon completely law-abiding
individuals.
' See Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 585-86, 155 A.2d 825, 830 (1959). Cf
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
2 H. HART, Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, in
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 75-82 (1968).

Those cases which do find criminal liability in the absence of fault, such as United States
v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), and United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922), have
been severely attacked. As one writer declared, "[tio inflict substantial punishment upon one
who is morally entirely innocent.., would so outrage the feelings of the community as to
nullify its own enforcement." Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56 (1933).
See also J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 303-05 (1947); G. WILUAMS,
CRIMINAL LAW §§ 70-76 (1953); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 401, 422-25 (1958); Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REv.
1097, 1109 (1952).
The principal federal forfeiture statutes can be found at 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1970)
(obscene books, pamphlets, pictures, films, and records); 18 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970) (money
used in bribery schemes); 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (1970) (articles not included in customs
declarations); 19 U.S.C. § 1594 (1970) (vessels and vehides used in violation of the
customs-revenue laws); 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (1970) (vessels, vehicles, animals, and aircraft used
for aiding unlawful importation); 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1970) (adulterated or misbranded foods,
drugs, devices, and cosmetics); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (Supp. 111, 1973) (controlled substances and
conveyances used to transport controlled substances); 26 U.S.C. § 5607 (1970) (property
used in connection with the unlawful use, recovery, or concealment of denatured distilled
spirits); 26 U.S.C. § 5612-5613 (1970) (distilled spirits); 26 U.S.C. § 5615 (1970) (stills,
distilleries, warehouses, and bottling establishments); 26 U.S.C. § 5661 (1970) (products and
materials used for violation of wine laws); 26 U.S.C. § 5671 (1970) (vessels, utensils, and
apparatus used in making beer); 26 U.S.C. § 5685 (1970) (explosives and firearms used in
violation of liquor laws); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7301-7303 (1970) (any property used in violation of
internal revenue laws); 46 U.S.C. § 325 (1970) (vessels used in violation of-licenses); 49
U.S.C. § 782 (1970) (vessels, vebicles, or aircraft used to transport narcotic drugs, firearms
or counterfeit coins, obligations or securities).
The states, of course, have their own forfeiture laws. New Jersey, for example, has
many such enactments covering virtually every type of property from fish nets (N.J. STAT
ANN. § 23:10-21 (Supp. 1974)) to milk (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:12A-39 (1973)) to narcotics (N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 24:21-35 (Supp. 1974)),
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The United States Supreme Court, however, has upheld the
constitutionality of such laws in the recent decision of Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 4 In this case a split Court determined
that the confiscation of an innocent owner's belongings did not
constitute a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The case is important not only for its reinforcement of the ancient principle of
"forfeiture," but also as an exposition of the continuing evolution
of the Burger Court's notions of procedural due process.
I
HISTORY OF FORFEITURE

The history of forfeiture statutes can be traced to the Old
Testament.5 The basis for modern forfeiture enactments-the
principle that inanimate objects and animals could be guilty of a
crime-found its way into the laws of ancient Greece, 6 Rome, 7 and
England. 8 Eventually this curious notion was implemented in
American law as well. 9 Despite the antiquity of their heritage,
4 416 U.S. 663 (1974).

' Exodus 21:28 contains the oft-quoted passage of Mosaical law: "lf an ox gore a man or
a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten
...."This portion of the Bible has been cited by many judges who have attempted to justify
modern forfeiture statutes. See, e.g., J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254
U.S. 505, 511 (1921); United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Coupe de Ville, 250 F. Supp. 183,
185 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
6 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 301 (T. Cooley 4th ed. 1899); Justice Holmes
illustrated this point by reference to a speech of ,Eschines: "[W]e banish beyond our borders
stocks and stones and steel, voiceless and mindless things, if they chance to kill a man; and if
a man commits suicide, bury the hand that struck the blow afar from its body." 0. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 8 (1881).
1 0. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 8-17.
8 The old English common law provided that any chattel that caused the death of a
person was forfeited to the crown as a deodand (from the Latin Deo dandum, "given to
God"). Originally the proceeds from the sale of the deodand were distributed to the poor in
order to appease God's wrath. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 300. Later, deodands became
a source of revenue and were then justified as a penalty for negligence. I M. HALE, PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 424 (1st American ed. 1847).
Deodand was different from the common law forfeiture of a felon's property. In the
latter case the conviction of the owner was a prerequisite for forfeiture, whereas deodand
was thought of as an in rem proceeding against the object itself. See Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-82 (1974); 21 KAN. L. REv. 235, 237-38
(1973).
9 Two Supreme Court cases have introduced this principle into American jurisprudence. In The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827), the Court held that a forfeiture of a
vessel for piracy was an in rem proceeding against the ship itself. Fifty years later the Court
extended this reasoning in the case of a seizure of real estate and a distillery for the liquor
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forfeiture statutes repeatedly have been challenged on fifth and
fourteenth amendment grounds as denying due process and allowing a taking of property without just compensation.
Not surprisingly, courts often have been reluctant to enforce
forfeitures demanded by governments. In J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.
-- Grant Co. v. United States,10 the government brought an action
against an automobile in which federal agents had found a large
quantity of untaxed liquor. The innocent vendor of the automobile, who had retained tide as security for the purchase price,
objected to confiscation of the vehicle alleging a deprivation of
property without due process of law." The Court noted that
according to prior decisions, the guilt or innocence of the owner
has no legal significance since the object itself is considered the
offender.' 2 Understandably, the Justices found such a conclusion
paradoxical and the opinion observed that the statute in question
seemed "to violate that justice which should be the foundation of
the due process of law required by the Constitution.'1 3 The Court,
however, recognized that history and precedent dictated a differ4
ent conclusion and upheld the forfeiture.'
The law changed little in the half century after Grant Co. as
courts continually, though often unwillingly, enforced forfeitures
law violations of a lessee. In Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1878),
the Court declared:
Nothing can be plainer in legal aecision than the proposition that the offence
therein defined is attached primarily to the distillery, and the real and personal
property used in connection with the same, without any regard whatsoever to the
personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner ....
The common law principle of forfeiture of a felon's property did not become part of
the law of this country. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1970) ("No conviction or judgment shall work
corruption of blood or any forfeiture of estate."). Nor did the concept of deodand take root
in American soil. See Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 188 S.W. 54 (1916). England
eliminated deodands and later abolished most forfeitures. See Finkelstein, The GoringOx, 46
TEMP. LQ. 169 (1973); 21 KAN. L. REv. 235 (1973); 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 433 (1952).
10 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
11 254 U.S. at 508-09.
12 Id. at 511. In Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577
(1931), the Supreme Court explained that "[iut is the property which is proceeded against,
and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious
instead of inanimate and insentient." Id. at 581.
13 254 U.S. at 510.
14 The opinion placed heavy reliance upon precedent to reach its result, citing both
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827), and Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S.
395 (1878). See note 9 supra. Such deference to old case law is common. Two good examples
are Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926), and United States v. One 1940 Packard
Coupe, 36 F. Supp. 788 (D. Mass. 1941). In the latter case the court said: "[I]n the fight of
the authorities, it is now too late to attempt a construction of the statutes here involved as
exempting from forfeiture the interest of a person in a chattel for the reason that he was
guiltless." Id. at 790.
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against blameless parties. Many times judges, expressing sympathy
for innocent persons, questioned the wisdom of such enactments 5
and invited both the Congress and the Supreme Court to change
the law.' 6 One court, for example, went so far as to declare:
The laws relating to forfeitures do cause one who is raised in the
traditions of the Anglo-American principles of justice and who is
committed to the constitutional principles of due process and just
compensation to search closely for a constitutional violation. 17
On other occasions judges refused to sanction seizures even when
this refusal forced them to bend the law or rewrite a statute.' 8 But
15 In United States v. One 1962 Ford Thunderbird, 232 F. Supp. I019 (N.D. 111.1964),
the court sustained the constitutionality of the forfeiture of an automobile seized pursuant to
49 U.S.C. § 782 (1970). In so doing it ruled that the statute did not violate the due process
clause by authorizing confiscation of the security interest of a lienor. After noting that
Congress hoped to prompt owners to be more careful about entrusting their property by
making it subject to forfeiture, the court expressed "grave doubts" as to the efficacy of the
law's policy as it applied to blameless creditors. 232 F. Supp. at 1022.
16 In United States v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 457 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1972), a bank
contested the confiscation of three automobiles to which it held legal title by virtue of its
purchase of security agreements. The vehicles in question were seized after they were used,
without the knowledge of the owner, to transport counterfeit Federal Reserve notes. The
Ninth Circuit nevertheless refused to grant relief. Said the court: "While we are not
unsympathetic to the position of innocent lenders such as is the Bank in these cases, only the
Congress or the Supreme Court may, at this time, afford the sought protection." Id. at
932-33.
17 United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 207 F. Supp. 693, 698 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). The
opinion in this case also noted:
Until or unless some judicial or administrative remedy is provided to relieve
innocent parties who have acted in good faith and with due diligence from the
harsh consequences of a forfeiture, it would appear that some constitutional
violation may exist.
Id. at 699.
"SA notable example of this occurred in Platt v. United States, 163 F.2d 165 (10th Cir.
1947). In this case the Tenth Circuit attempted to avoid the effect of the holding in United
States v. One Dodge Coupe, 43 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). In One Dodge Coupe the suspect
drove the Dodge to a location and parked it in order to enter another car in which he
bought four packages of heroin. The court held that the government could confiscate the
Dodge since it had "facilitated" the sale of illegal drugs. Id. at 61-62. The Platt court evaded
the impact of One Dodge Coupe by creating an exception to the forfeiture statute involved, 49
U.S.C. § 782 (1970).
In Platt a drug-addict daughter used the family car to drive to a neighborhood
drugstore where she illegally obtained morphine with a forged prescription. The court of
appeals held that the United States could not confiscate the car since the vehicle did not
"facilitate" the sale. According to the opinion, the "use of the automobile did not.., make
the sale any less difficult. It was merely the means of locomotion by which Blanche Cooper
went to the store to make the purchase." 163 F.2d at 167. There is no basis in the statute for
this tenuous distinction between "locomotion" and "facilitation."
Despite this flaw, the Platt case has been followed because of its equitable result. See, e.g.,
United States v. One 1949 Ford Sedan, 96 F. Supp. 341 (W.D.N.C. 1951); 27 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 433, 441-42 (1952). Furthermore, Platt was reinforced by United States v. One 1941
Pontiac Sedan, 83 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), in which a court drew a distinction between
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for the most part, courts felt compelled to follow the well-settled
law in this area and they did not return property to claimants. 19
Until recently this era of judicial acquiescence in the gross
hardship caused to innocent people by forfeiture statutes appeared
to be heading to a richly deserved end. By the end of the 1960's
some courts were noticeably bolder in their determination to
change the law. The Supreme Court itself, in United States v. United
States Coin and Currency,2 ° extended an invitation to lower courts to
re-examine forfeiture laws insofar as they caused hardship to
innocent people. The majority announced that it was not entirely
satisfied that these statutes "with such a broad sweep" could pass
constitutional inspection.2 '
Other judges also shared this change of attitude. The Sixth
Circuit, for example, in McKeehan v. United States,2 2 held that the
imposition of a forfeiture in that case caused an unconstitutional
deprivation of property without just compensation even though
the petitioner had actually violated a federal firearms statute. 3
Three unregistered machine guns, kept as souvenirs by a private
citizen, were seized by federal authorities. The court, however,
ruled against the United States after determining that the seized
property was not "per se contraband"2 4 and that there was no valid
a vehicle used by an addict (which, like the car in Plait, cannot be seized) and one used by a
peddler (which can be confiscated as a tool of crime). There is no basis for this addictpeddler distinction in 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1970). Like the locomotion-facilitation rule, this is
merely a way to temper the law's harshness.

For a particularly oppressive application of the facilitation rule, see Biasotti v. Clarke, 51
F. Supp. 608 (D.R.I. 1943), in which a court held that a house trailer, which was connected
to municipal water, sewer, and electricity lines, and which was used as a family dwelling for
over a year prior to seizure, was a "vehicle" and not a "home" and was therefore subject to
forfeiture under 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1970), since it had been used to facilitate the transportation and possession of a narcotic drug.
"9See, e.g., United States v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 457 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. One 1962 Ford Thunderbird, 232 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ill.
1964); United
States v. One 1940 Packard Coupe, 36 F. Supp. 788 (D. Mass. 1941).
20 401 U.S. 715 (1971). Coin and Currency involved a proceeding to forfeit $8,674
allegedly used in an illegal bookmaking operation.
21 401 U.S. at 720. In this regard the Supreme Court observed that "[e]ven Blackstone,
who is not known as a biting critic of the English legal tradition, condemned the seizure of
the property of the innocent as based upon a 'superstition' inherited from the 'blind days' of
feudalism." Id. at 720-21. For Blackstone's views on the forfeiture of innocent people's
possessions, see W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at 300.
22 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1971).
23 26 U.S.C. § 5841 (1970). This statute requires that certain weapons he entered in the
National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.
2 There is a difference between "per se contraband" (possession of which is illegal
under all circumstances) and "derivative contraband" (property which is made illegal by
wrongful use). Examples of "per se contraband" include sawed-off shotguns, pornographic
books, and certain gambling equipment. Automobiles, money, and ordinary household
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or administrative reason to warrant the
legislative, revenue,
5
confiscation.

2

A similar result was reached in Suhomlin v. United States. 2 6 In
this case nine claimants, bar owners, were found to have negligently violated a civil tax law provision; they were not involved in
criminal activity. Nevertheless, federal authorities seized a large
amount of their property. Under these facts a federal district court
ordered the government to return the seized belongings.2 7 At the
very least, McKeehan and Suhomlin indicated that some judges were
willing to consider the fault of the owner a relevant factor in
forfeiture cases.2 8
Then in United States v. One 1971 Ford Truck, 2 9 another district
court considered the constitutionality of one of the most widely
used federal forfeiture statutes. 30 The court observed that the
claimant, whose truck had been used in the illegal transfer of a
gun, had "absolutely no connection with the crime whatsoever" 3 1
and had neither knowledge nor suspicion that the offense would
be committed. The opinion nevertheless concluded that precedent
would still hold that the owner was not "innocent enough" to get
his truck back. 3 2 But the court did not end its inquiry there. "We
have searched carefully" the court stated, "and although mindful
items, for example, may be "derivative contraband." See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965); Comment, Forfeitures-Civilor Criminal?, 43 TEMP.

LQ. 191 (1970); 21 KAN. L. REv. 235, 236 n.3 (1973).
25 438 F.2d at 745.
26 345 F. Supp. 650 (D. Md. 1972). In a series of raids, IRS agents seized liquor and
amusement licenses, cash, checks, and alcoholic beverages for the owners' failure to pay a
federal retail liquor dealer's tax of $54 as required by 26 U.S.C. § 5121(a) (1970). The
seizures were made pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7302 (1970), the same statute that was before
the Supreme Court in Coin and Currency. See note 20 supra.

27 345 F. Supp. at 655. The owners of the seized property conceded that they had failed
to pay the special tax and the United States did not allege that the violations were willful.
Nor did the government claim that the owners had committed any other infractions. The
court observed that immediately after the seizures, the bar owners paid the special $54 tax.
Id. at 652-53.
28 See notes 9, 12, and 14 supra.
29 346 F. Supp. 613 (C.D. Cal. 1972). In this case a father left his son in charge of the
family truck with explicit instructions as to the use of the vehicle. Disoheying his father's
instructions, the son hid an unregistered sawed-off shotgun behind the driver's seat. He
later tried to sell the contraband weapon to a special investigator of the Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms Division of the Treasury Department. The son was arrested for the possession
and illegal transfer of the shotgun and the truck was seized.
30 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1970). This statute provides for the forfeiture of any vessel, vehicle,
or aircraft which has been used to transport or conceal narcotics, firearms, or counterfeit
currency or securities.
31 346 F. Supp. at 616.
32 Id. at 619.
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of the many cases to the contrary, we feel compelled to do away
-33 Accordingly, the opinion held
....
innocent
that the statute was unconstitutional insofar as it deprived
3 4
compensation.
just
without
property
their
owners of
Armed with the changes in the law and judicial attitudes
evidenced by Coin and Currency, McKeehan, Suhomlin, and 1971 Ford
Truck, attorneys for the Pearson Yacht Leasing Company contested
the confiscation of the Parranda,a boat which had been chartered
to a couple in Puerto Rico. 35 Puerto Rican authorities had seized
the yacht 3 6 after finding one marijuana cigarette on board. There
was no suggestion from the record, however, that the pleasure
craft had been used in smuggling or that anything more than
possession of an illegal drug was involved.3
A three-judge district court found that the Puerto Rican forfeiture statutes were unconstitutional under the fifth and fourteenth amendments 3 8 and the Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction3 9 and undertook to review
the well-settled, but uniformly criticized,40 law of forfeitures.

with this enclave of injustice

33 Id. at 618.
3 The constitutional question could have been avoided since it was possible to return
the truck to the claimant-father under the provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1970). This statute
provides that no forfeiture may take place when the vessel, vehicle, or aircraft is acquired in
violation of either federal or state criminal law. The judge found that the son came into
possession of the truck in violation of California law. 346 F. Supp. at 620.
'5 Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337 (D.P.R. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
36 The seizure was made pursuant to P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 24, § 2512 (Supp. 1974), and
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 34, § 1722 (1971). These two statutes provide that all conveyances
(including vessels) which are used, or are intended to be used, to transport or facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of any controlled substance (including marijuana) shall be subject to forfeiture. Such proceedings can be initiated by seizure of
the conveyance without prior notice to any party having an interest in it. Notice must be
given, however, within 10 days after the seizure and a challenge may be filed within 15 days
following service of the original notice. Within 10 days after the filing of the challenge, the
Commonwealth must return the seized property if a bond is posted for the conveyance's
assessed value. If a challenge is not filed within 15 days after the receipt of the notice, or if
no bond has been posted within 25 days after service of notice, the Commonwealth may
destroy, use, or sell the conveyance.
37 416 U.S. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38 Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337, 1343 (D.P.R. 1973), rev'd sub
nom. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). The district court
also issued an injunction restraining the Commonwealth from enforcing the statutes insofar
as they deny the opportunity for a hearing prior to the seizure of property and impose a
penalty on innocent parties. 363 F. Supp. at 1343-44.
39 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 414 U.S. 816 (1973).
40 For a strong attack on forfeiture laws, see Finkelstein, supra note 9. For other works
critical of modern forfeiture statutes, see 21 KAN. L. REv. 235 (1973); 38 NOTRE DAME LAW.
727 (1963).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:467

II
THE MAJORITY AND DISSENTING OPINIONS

Over fifty years ago Justice Holmes remarked that "[i]f a thing
has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it
will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect
it .... -41 Apparently, the Pearson Court felt that the appellee had
not presented facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality that centuries had conferred on forfeiture enactments, for it reversed the district court and upheld the confiscation.
A majority of the Court, 42 speaking through Justice
Brennan, 43 was obviously impressed by the long history of forfeitures. As the opinion explicitly noted, "The historical background
of forfeiture statutes in this country and this Court's prior decisions sustaining their constitutionality lead to [the] conclusion....
[that] statutory forfeiture schemes are not rendered unconstitutional because of their applicability to the property interests of
innocents .... -44 Indeed, much of the Pearson opinion is a history
of the law of deodand, common law forfeiture in England, and a
summary of early cases which introduced this feature into Ameri45
can law.
Perhaps reluctant to strike down a practice legitimized by time,
the Court decided the case on a narrow ground. Justice Brennan
placed much emphasis on the fact that the yacht company had
"voluntarily entrusted" the boat to the lessee, thereby ignoring the
obvious fact that Pearson was in the business of renting pleasure
craft. 46 The majority also found it significant that "no allegation
41 Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).

42 There are three parts to the Pearson decision. In the first part, in which the Court
held that a direct appeal was proper from the three-judge district court under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1253 (1970), the vote was unanimous. Justice Douglas was the lone dissenter from the
second part in which the majority determined that due process did not require the
Commonwealth to provide notice and a hearing before the seizure of the boat. Justice
Stewart joined the Douglas dissent in the third portion of the Court's opinion, which held
that the seizure of the yacht was not an unconstitutional taking of property without just
compensation. Justice White, who joined the majority opinion, wrote a short concurring
opinion in which Justice Powell joined.
13 Ironically, Justice Brennan had joined the majority opinion in Coin and Currency,
which caused much of the ferment in this area of the law by inviting lower courts to
re-examine the constitutionality of the confiscation of innocent people's property. See notes
20 & 21 and accompanying text supra. For Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Coin and
Currency, see 401 U.S. at 724-44.
44 416 U.S. at 680.
41 Id. at 680-88. See note 9 supra.
4C Id. at 690.
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has been made or proof offered that the company did all that it
reasonably could to avoid having its property put to an unlawful
use." 4 7 In short, the Court evaded the constitutional question by
suggesting that the yacht company had negligently rented the boat;
therefore, under no circumstances was it entitled to relief. In this
manner the majority did not reach the issue of whether the fifth
and fourteenth amendments prohibited the forfeiture of property
of innocent and non-negligent owners.
The Court's disposition of the case is significant in several
respects even though it did not reach the constitutional issues. On
the theoretical level, this opinion evidences a small, but important
shift in the Supreme Court's position. In Grant Co. the Court had
declared that forfeitures, no matter how unjust, are "too firmly
fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to
be now displaced. '48 However, following the lead of the Coin and
Currency decision, the Pearson majority appeared to be ready to
question the long line of cases holding that the innocence of the
owner of seized property is without constitutional significance.4 9
The Court intimated that under some fact situations it might be
ready to relieve blameless parties from "unduly oppressive"
50
confiscations.
Justice Brennan also suggested a test to measure the conduct
of property owners in future cases. To be eligible for the return of
seized belongings, the individual could not, of course, be aware of
or involved in the criminal activity that led to the confiscation.
Furthermore, such a person would have to prove "that he had
done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property." 5 1
Despite the use of the word "reasonably," the Supreme Court's
standard of care appears to be a very strict one. The three-judge
district court noted that the rental agreement between the yacht
company and the lessee had a clause which specifically prohibited
any illegal use of the boat.5 2 And after hearing all the evidence, the
47 Id. See note 54 infra.
48 J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921).
4' See notes 9, 12, and 14 supra.
50 416 U.S. at 689-90. The majority implied that it might be "unduly oppressive" for a
state to confiscate property which had been taken from its owner "without his privity or
consent." Id. at 689.
51 Id. at 689.
52 363 F. Supp. at 1340. in order to enforce this provision, the lease further provided
that forfeiture of the hoat would neither discharge nor diminish the obligation of the lessee
to pay rent. A copy of the rental agreement may be found in Appendix C of the Appellants'
Jurisdictional Statement submitted to the Supreme Court in this case.
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lower court concluded that Pearson was totally unaware that its
craft was being put to illegal use and therefore was "completely
innocent of the lessee's criminal act."'53 Given these findings, it is
unclear what additional precautions the yacht company should
have taken to meet the majority's standard. 54 In light of Brennan's
observation that the record was barren as to Pearson's conduct, it
would have been logical for the Court to have remanded the case
for further findings of fact, as Justice Douglas proposed in his
dissent.

55

In this short but strong dissent, Douglas did not dispute the
Court's contention that under some circumstances the state has the
right to confiscate the property of innocent parties. He stated,
however, that "traditional forfeiture doctrine cannot at times be
reconciled with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. '5 6 In
contrast, Justice Brennan would only hint that57 there was a possibility of constitutional violation in some cases.
Justice Douglas would subject owners to a more permissive
standard of care in the transfer of their property. Under his test, a
person would be entitled to relief as long as he or she was "inno
way implicated in the illegal project." 5 8 This formulation is differ51 363 F. Supp. at 1340.
54 It would have been very difficult for the yacht company to have monitored the use of
its leased craft since all of its rentals were long term-three to seven years. Letter from J. J.
Serota, Vice President and General Counsel, Grumman Allied Industries, Inc., to author,
Jan. 23, 1975 (on file at the Cornell Law Review). In this case, the lease was for a five-year
period. Id. Although the agreement was couched in lease terms, the transaction was in
substance a sale. The "lessee" would "rent" the boat over a period of time, at the end of
which he would receive a bill of sale for $2.50. According to Pearson, there "never existed
any real possibility of reverter to the lessor." Not surprisingly, this type of transaction gave
the yacht company virtually no opportunity to supervise the use of its craft. Id.
Possibly, Justice Brennan thought that Pearson should have required the lessee to post a
bond to assure that there would be no illegal use of the boat. But such a practice could have
an adverse effect on .the company's business. In any event, the strict standard of care
suggested by the Court could make it very hard for anyone with a criminal history to borrow
money or property. Lending to an individual with a record of convictions might be regarded
as an indication that the lender did not exercise the required caution. In other words, a
court could find that lending money to a felon is a careless act which makes the creditor
ineligible for the return of seized property which constituted security. Cf.United States v.
One 1967 Ford Mustang, 457 F.2d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1972); 21 KAN. L. REv. 235, 247
(1973).
55 416 U.S. at 694 (Douglas, J., dissenting). On this point Justice Douglas wrote that he
would
remand the case to the three-judge district court for findings as to the innocence of
the lessor of the yacht-whether the illegal use was of such magnitude or notoriety
that the owner cannot be found faultless in remaining ignorant of its -occurrence.
Id.
5. Id. at 693.
51 Id. at 688-90. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
58Id. at 694.
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ent from the majority's since it does not require the owner actively
to take steps to prevent illegal use of property.
In any case, Justice Douglas would search more closely than
the majority to find a constitutional violation, especially in cases of
"extreme hardship" where "harsh judge-made law should be tempered with justice. ' 59 To Douglas, Pearson was such a case, and it is
clear that on the facts presented to the Court he would have
60
returned the boat to the company.
III
THE REVENUE ASPECT OF FoFEITURES

Perhaps the Court's decision to uphold the constitutionality of
the forfeiture in the Pearson case can best be explained by the
61
majority's unwillingness to hamper effective law enforcement.
Justice Brennan characterized forfeiture statutes as serving
"legitimate governmental interests" because they prevent further
unlawful use of property and render illegal behavior unprofitable
"by imposing an economic penalty. '62 And according to the Court,
the confiscation of the belongings of lessors, bailors, and secured
creditors "may have the desirable effect of inducing them to
exercise greater care in transferring possession of their
'63
property.
59 Id. at 693.

60 Id. Commenting on the facts, Justice Douglas wrote that he thought this was a case
where the fifth amendment required the payment of compensation. See note. 56 and
accompanying text supra.
1 Some observers have blamed the Warren Court for the explosive growth in the
nation's crime. Senator McClellan of Arkansas, for example, voiced this sentiment in a
speech before the Senate. 115 CONG. REc. 23,235 (1969). Since that time, changes in the
composition of the Court, and possibly the criticism of political leaders, appear to have
caused the Court to subordinate the rights of criminal defendants to the power of the state
to fight lawlessness. See, e.g., Guntber, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword:In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1972).
62 416 U.S. at 687, 688. See H.R. REP. No. 1054, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939):
It has been the experience of our enforcement officers that the best way to
strike at commercialized crime is through the pocketbooks of the criminals who
engage in it. By decreasing the profits which make illicit activity of this type
possible, crime itself can also be decreased. Vessels, vebicles, and aircraft may be
termed "the operating tools" of dope peddlers, counterfeiters, and gangsters. They
represent tangible major capital investments to criminals whose liquid assets, if any,
are frequently not accessible to the Government.
Id. at 2. The report also noted that "[i]f such means of transportatiorf are not forfeited, they
will be readily available for future violations." Id. at 3.
It is important to note that none of these reasons would support the forfeiture in the
instant case, since neitber the lessee nor the lessor was engaged in smuggling.
63 416 U.S. at 688. Cf. United States v. One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U.S. 219, 238-41
(1939) (DouglasJ, dissenting). In United States v. 1,960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
398 (1814), the Supreme Court said:
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Yet the majority opinion did not explain why this legitimate
state interest is so powerful that it can insulate forfeiture enactments from constitutional attack. As the Court noted, seizures are
often used -by governments to raise revenue. 4 In its amicus brief in
Pearson, the United States defended such laws because they "help
to compensate the government for the cost of apprehending law
violators. ' 65 This justification of forfeiture laws has even been
adopted by the Supreme Court. In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v.
United States, 66 the opinion noted that seizures serve to reimburse
67
governments for investigation and enforcement expenses.
The Pearson case itself illustrates the revenue-producing aspect
of confiscations. Originally, the Commonwealth intended to sell the
Parranda at an auction to raise money for the public treasury.
However, the authorities later decided to retain the pleasure craft
for "official use."' 68 In light of the actual facts of the case, therefore,
In the eternal struggle that exists between the avarice, enterprise, and combinations
of individuals on the one hand, and the power charged with the administration of
the laws on the other, severe laws are rendered necessary to enable the executive to
carry into effect the measures of policy adopted by the legislature.
Id. at 405.
The Supreme Court first articulated the "secondary defense" justification for the
forfeiture of innocent people's property in Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
Statutes which authorize the seizure of law-abiding citizens' possessions, according to the
Court,
suggest that certain uses of property may be regarded as so undesirable that the
owner surrenders his control at his peril. The law thus builds a secondary defense
against a forbidden use and precludes evasions by dispensing with the necessity of
judicial inquiry as to collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent
owner.
Id. at 467-68.
11 416 U.S. at 687-88 n.26.
The revenue aspect of forfeitures was dramatically highlighted in New Jersey v. Kaiser,
476 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1973). In this case the state and federal governments went to court to
see who had the right to confiscate $265,000 seized from an illegal bookmaking operation.
The federal government won.
65 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). One congressional committee report supplied another
version of this rationale: confiscated vehicles, vessels, and aircraft would be available
"without expense to the Government" for use in the capture of criminals. H.R. REP. No.
1054, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1939).
66 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
67Id. at 237. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938).
68 363 F. Supp. at 1340 n.9.
The Puerto Rican authorities were going to sell the Parranda.Letter from J. J. Serota,
Vice President and General Counsel, Grumman Allied Industries, Inc., to author, Jan. 23,
1975 (on file at the Cornell Law Review). However, a vacationing Pearson Yacht dealer saw
the legal notice of the auction and called Grumman's office in New York. Id. Pearson's
attorneys in San Juan immediately sought and received a restraining order enjoining the
sale. Id. The three-judge district court, on the other hand, found that Grumman learned of
the seizure after the lessee defaulted on the rental payments. 363 F. Supp. at 1340.
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Puerto Rico's assertion that "no property is being taken 'for public
use' "69 does not withstand scrutiny.
It is precisely this type of governmental abuse, so clearly
demonstrated in the instant case, that the fifth amendment was
designed to guard against. As the Supreme Court said in Armstrong
0
v. United States,7
[t]he Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall
not be taken for a public use without just compensation was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all 7 fairness
and justice, should be
1
borne by the public as a whole.

Of course, a violati6n of the just-compensation clause is all the
more offensive and unjust when the state seizes the belongings of
innocent people.
In light of such a questionable practice, it is surprising that this
aspect of the fifth amendment issue was neither briefed nor argued
by the yacht company."2 Indeed, it is hard to imagine a clearer case
of taking property without just compensation than the public use
73
of seizures to collect revenue.
IV
THE NATURE OF FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS

The law of forfeitures before the Pearson case was characterized by conflicting decisions. The Supreme Court, however, did
little to correct this situation, although it had the opportunity to do
so. The Brennan opinion unfortunately did not attempt to harmonize apparently conflicting precedents or overrule those which
74
were inconsistent with Pearson.
69

(1974).
70
71
72

Brief for Appellant at 13, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
364 U.S. 40 (1960).
Id. at 49.
On the taking issue Pearson's brief concentrated primarily on a discussion of United

States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971), and some Puerto Rican
precedents construing the Commonwealth's forfeiture laws. Brief for Appellee at 4-7,
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
'13
Cf. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36, 63 (1964).
74 See, e.g., United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); One
1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); Various Items of Personal
Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926);J.
W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbins's Distillery v.
United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827); McKeehan v.
United States, 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. One 1971 Ford Truck, 346 F.
Supp. 613 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Suhomlin v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 650 (D. Md. 1972).
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The most noticeable shortcoming in the majority opinion is the
failure to decide, or even to clarify, the character of forfeiture
proceedings. It was once well-settled that such actions were civil in
nature so that the guilt of the owner need not be considered, as it
must in criminal proceedings. The state, resorting to the legal
fiction that inanimate objects were capable of wrongdoing,7 5 procases,
ceeded against the property itself and not the owner. Many
76
immaterial.
is
innocence
owner's
the
that
hold
therefore,
However, a respectable minority of courts have done much to
undermine this traditional theory.77 Three Supreme Court cases,
for example, have declared that even though forfeiture actions are
78
technically civil in form, they are criminal in substance and effect.
One lower federal court even went so far as to explicitly discard the
fiction that cars and boats can be just as guilty of crimes as men and
women. In McKeehan v. United States,7 9 the Sixth Circuit concluded
that the outcome of forfeiture contests may be determined with
reference to the owner's guilt or innocence. 0
The Supreme Court, however, declined the opportunity to
decide whether such proceedings are civil or criminal. Justice
Brennan's opinion did not even criticize, much less overrule,
McKeehan, which would appear to be in conflict with Pearson, and
which was relied upon by the district court below. 8 1
The Pearson majority also did not comment upon those cases
creating safeguards for property owners in forfeiture contests
which were once thought to be limited to criminal proceedings. In
See note 12 supra.
J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921), is the leading
case on this point. See notes 10-14 and accompanying text supra.
If only the "guilt" of the property is before the court, the state need not convict a person
of a crime before it confiscates the property. In Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926),
the purchaser of an automobile agreed to let the vendor use the vehicle as partial
consideration for the sale. The state then charged that the vendor's employee, Brown, had
used the car to transport illegal liquor. After trial, Kansas confiscated the automobile, but
soon thereafter Brown was acquitted on all counts. The Supreme Court held that the
forfeiture of the car was constitutional even though the state failed to prove that anyone was
guilty or even that a crime bad occurred at all. For cases which hold that a criminal
conviction is not a prerequisite to a forfeiture, see United States v. One 1965 Buick, 397 F.2d
782 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. One 1937 Model Ford Coach, 57 F. Supp. 977, 978
(W.D.S.C. 1944). See Finkelstein, supra note 9. But see United States v. United States Coin &
Currency, 401 U.S.' 715 (1971).
77 See, e.g., United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); One
1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886); McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1971).
78 See notes 82-84 and accompanying text infra.
79 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1971).
60 Id. at 745. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
81 363 F. Supp. at 1341.
75

76
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Boyd v. United States,8 2 for example, the Supreme Court held that
defendants in such actions could properly assert a fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. In another case, One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,8 3 the Court decided that the fourth
and fourteenth amendments prohibited the introduction of illegally seized evidence in a forfeiture contest. Both cases have been
followed in later decisions.8 4 Since Pearson did not express its
disapproval of these precedents, it is probable that lower courts will
extend this protection as one way to avoid unjust confiscations.
Although Justice Brennan's opinion did not prevent judges
from relieving innocent owners from harsh forfeitures, it also did
not limit the authority of the state to forfeit property. In most
instances governments may still proceed with impunity against the
belongings of law-abiding people. Not surprisingly, law enforcement officials have sought to give forfeiture statutes the broadest
possible scope. In Suhomlin v. United States, 85 the district court, in
ordering the return of seized property, observed that under the
86
Justice Department's interpretation of a revenue forfeiture law,
the government could seize all the business property of a sole
proprietor who unintentionally underpaid his income taxes.8 7
Given such a power, the Internal Revenue Service, or any other
government agency, could circumvent legislative acts by
confiscating property worth more than the appropriate statutory
8
fines and penalties.
Unfortunately, governments have sought to exercise this
power, as the Suhomlin court feared they would. In Commonwealth v.

One 1970 Lincoln Automobile,8 9 for example, the Supreme Court of

Virginia upheld the confiscation of a vehicle valued at $8,700
116 U.S. 616 (1886). In this case the federal government charged that the defendants
had imported 35 cases of plate glass without paying the required duties. In a forfeiture
proceeding the United States ordered the defendants to produce their business records,
which they did under protest. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the defendants had
a fourth and fifth amendment privilege to withhold their papers. Id. at 634-35.
83 380 U.S. 693 (1965). The case involved a warrantless and illegal search of an
automobile for untaxed liquor. See 69 DIcK. L. Rzv. 284 (1965).
84 The most notable are United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715
(1971), and McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 197"1).
85 345 F. Supp. 650 (D. Md. 1972). See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
86 26 U.S.C. § 7302 (1970).
11 345 F. Supp. at 655.
88 This possibility was also discussed in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693 (1965), where the Court noted that the offender was liable for a maximum fine of
$500 in a criminal proceeding, but subject to the loss of his car, valued at $1,000, in a civil
action. Id. at 701. See note 83 supra.
89 212 Va. 597, 186 S.E.2d 279 (1972).
82
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because the owner was found guilty of driving with a revoked
license.9 0 Justice Brennan's proposed standard of care, however,
would not have provided relief for the defendant in this case since
he had committed an intentional, though seemingly minor, infraction. Nor would this test limit the power of governments to exact
excessive forfeitures where there have been negligent violations of
the law, such as those which occurred in McKeehan and Suhomlin.9
The harshness of some seizures, including the one in 1970 Lincoln
Automobile, has led to suggestions 92 that such confiscations would
constitute an "excessive fine" specifically prohibited by the eighth
amendment.9 3 The Pearson majority, however, chose not to address
this problem.
The ultimate impact of the Pearson decision, of course, remains to be seen. In the short run this case leaves the law of
forfeitures in an unsatisfactory state. Later decisions will have to
tackle the questions that Justice Brennan's opinion did not attempt
to answer. Whatever its shortcomings, though, Pearson will have an
important effect on the law in one respect. Even though it did not
break new ground, this case is significant because it affirmed old
and much criticized precedents9 4 and thereby reinforced the authority of the state as sovereign to confiscate property. Insofar as
Pearson supports the power of government to seize the possessions
of its citizens, the decision limits the scope of the fifth amendment's
95
just-compensation clause.
V
THE DUE PROCESS ASPECT OF FORFEITURES
Aside from the constitutionality of forfeitures, the Pearson
Court considered whether the fifth and fourteenth amendments
90 The owner was also fined $100 and sentenced to ten days in jail (seven of which were

suspended) for his offense. Id. at 598, 186 S.E.2d at 280.
91 See notes 23, 26, 27 and accompanying text supra.
9 In Toepleman v. United States, 263 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1959), the court remarked
that
while the Eighth Amendment has generally been thought to apply only to criminal
cases... there would seem to be no basis in reason why a court could not invoke
the Eighth Amendment, either specifically or by analogy, to prevent an abuse of the
power of punishment though it be only manifested in a civil form.
Id. at 700. See also 38 NOTRE DAME LAw. 727, 736 (1963); 51 TEXAS L. REv. 1411, 1417
(1973).
" U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
1"
excessive fines imposed ....
94 See notes 9, 10, and 14 supra.
" The effect of forfeiture precedents on other areas of the law is discussed in
Finkelstein, supra note 9.

1975]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

require notice and hearing before the seizure of property. On this
issue attorneys for the yacht company relied principally upon
Fuentes v. Shevin, 9 6 which held unconstitutional as a denial of due
process Florida and Pennsylvania statutes which allowed prejudgment summary seizure of chattels on a writ of replevin. Pearson
argued that the Puerto Rican statutes, which provided for only
97
post-seizure hearings, were likewise constitutionally inadequate.
The three-judge district court agreed and declared the law uncon98
stitutional on its face.
The Supreme Court, however, viewed the problem differently.
The majority correctly pointed out that however broadly it may be
interpreted, Fuentes did not require a preseizure hearing in every
instance. 99 According to that case there are "extraordinary situations" in which notice and a hearing may be postponed. 0 0 But
before the state may dispense with these procedural safeguards,
certain criteria must be met: the seizure must be "directly necessary
to secure an important governmental or general public interest"
where there is a "special need for very prompt action."''
In
addition, the state must keep "strict control over its monopoly of
legitimate force."' 0 2 In other words, a governmental official who
initiates the seizure must be responsible for determining, under a
narrowly drawn statute, that such action is necessary and
justifiable.
The Pearson majority then hastily explained that Puerto Rico's
seizure of the Parrandasatisfied this test.' 0 3 The Court's rationale,
however, invites scrutiny. There is no doubt that the seizure of the
craft was initiated by a proper official and it is at least arguable that
confiscation serves an important governmental interest. But if the
96 407 U.S. 67 (1972).-See Gunther, supra note 61, at 85-95.

9' Brief for Appellee at 9, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974).
One of the statutes, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 34, § 1722 (1971), provides that "[t]he
proceedings shall be begun by the seizure of property by the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of the Treasury or the Police Superintendent, through their delegates, policemen
or other peace officers." See note 36 supra.
98 363 F. Supp. at 1342.
99 The Pearson Court also emphasized that Fuentes required that statutory procedures
depriving debtors of their property must provide for hearings "at a meaningful time." 416
U.S. at 678.
100407 U.S. at 90. The Court in Fuentes observed that the Supreme Court has allowed
immediate seizure in cases where it has been necessary to protect the public from bank
failures, contaminated food and misbranded drugs, and to aid the government in the
collection of taxes and in the prosecution of war. Id. at 91-92.
101 Id.
102

103

at 91.

Id.
416 U.S. at 679-80.
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actions of the Commonwealth authorities provide any indication, it
is clear that there was no need for swift action in this case. As
Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent, there was an interval of
over two months between the date the police discovered the marijuana and the date they seized the yacht.1 0 4 If there was a need for
"very prompt action" in this case, only the Supreme Court recognized it.
Pearson, therefore, shows that the broad holding of Fuentes can
be undermined by the use of the "extraordinary situations" exception. If the majority was willing to fit the instant case under this
loophole, then it appears likely that the Court will circumvent
Fuentes by enlarging this exception on a case-by-case basis. After
Pearson, Fuentes offers less protection to the individual from the
power of the state to seize property since it appears that the Court
will not interpret this loophole narrowly, as some scholars had
predicted.1 0 5
Pearson is also significant because it sheds light upon the
continued vitality of Fuentes after Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.1 06 In
Mitchell a 5-4 majority sustained the constitutionality of a Louisiana
sequestration law which resembled the replevin statute invalidated
in Fuentes. The statutes considered in these two cases were so
similar that five Justices believed that the prior case had been
overturned by the latter, although this conclusion was not incorpo07
rated in the majority opinion.
Despite Mitchell, Justice Brennan did not question the yacht
company's contention that Fuentes was controlling in Pearson. Indeed, the majority opinion assumed that it was. The Court, however, merely determined that a preseizure hearing was unnecessary
because the case came under a recognized exception.1 0 8 In decidId. at 691 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105 E.g., Gunther, supra note 61, at 88-89; Comment, Fuentes v. Shevin: The Constitutionality of Texas' Landlord Laws and Other Summary Procedures, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 215, 232-33
(1973).
106 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
107 In a dissenting opinion in which Justices Douglas and Marshall concurred, Justice
104

Stewart wrote that Mitchell "is constitutionally indistinguishable from Fuentes v. Shevin, and
the Court today has simply rejected the reasoning of that case and adopted instead the
analysis of the Fuentes dissent." 416 U.S. at 634. Justice Brennan noted that he was in
agreement with the three other dissenters that Fuentes was controlling in Mitchell. Id. at 636.
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, stated that he thought that the "sweeping
language" of Fuentes was "overruled" by Mitchell and implied that the prior case should have
no applicability beyond its particular facts. Id. at 623.
For another analysis of Mitchell's effect on Fuentes, see North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719, 727 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See note 109 infra.
108 416 U.S. at 679-80.
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ing Pearson in this manner, the Supreme Court in effect declared
that all seizure cases would still have to be argued within the
Fuentes framework.

The majority, of course, did not have to accept Fuentes as
dispositive of Pearson. The Court, after all, could have determined
that Mitchell had overruled Fuentes. On the other hand, the Pearson
majority could have decided that Mitchell confined Fuentes to its
facts so that the prior case had no relevance to forfeiture proceedings.
It would have come as no surprise if the Supreme Court had
completely abandoned Fuentes, thereby continuing the due process
retreat highlighted in Mitchell.10 9 If the majority had chosen to
fashion a new rule applicable to all seizures made for the public
benefit,"10 there was certainly ample precedent for the Court to
build upon. In Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,"' for example, the

Supreme Court declared that where there is a substantial countervailing purpose, "[t]he Fifth Amendment does not require a trialtype hearing in every conceivable case of government impairment
of private interest."' 1 2 Another case, Phillips v. Commissioner," 3
109 In this regard, one commentator has written that "Mitchell is important because it
marks a substantial retreat by the Supreme Court from prior precedent relating to the
procedural due process requirement of prior notice and hearing .... " Hobbs, Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co.: The 1974 Revised Edition of Consumer Due Process, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 182
(1974). For another analysis of the Mitchell case, see Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term,
Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REv. 13, 71-83 (1974).
This retreat seems to have been halted, at least momentarily, by the Court's decision in
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975). In this case, the Court,
by a 6-3 majority, struck down a Georgia garnishment statute which had "none of the saving
characteristics" of the Louisiana sequestration law considered in Mitchell. Id. at 722. Justice
Stewart was moved to quip, in the language of Mark Twain, "It is gratifying to note that my
report of the demise ofFuentes v. Shevin ... seems to have been greatly exaggerated." Id. at
723.
Although this decision will probably give Fuentes a new lease on life, it is significant that
the Court did not rule that due process requires preseizure notice to the debtor when the
state lends its judicial machinery to aid a creditor.
110 Such a rule could be applied to all seizures instituted by the state to secure "the
public interest." In other words, in addition to forfeitures, it might include those seizures
covered by the Fuentes "extraordinary situations" exception. See note 100 supra.
211 367 U.S. 886 (1961). Cafeteria Workers involved a short-order cook employed by a
private concessionaire on a secret defense installation who lost her security clearance and her
job. The Court held that the summary dismissal of the cook, without a hearing, did not
offend the fifth amendment's due process clause.
112 Id. at 894. The Court also stated that
consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been
affected by governmental action.
Id. at 895.
13 283 U.S. 589 (1931). In this case the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed a
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stated that "[w]here only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial inquiry is ,not a denial of due process, if
the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the
1' 14
liability is adequate."
Both Cafeteria Workers and Phillips, however, could be distinguished from Pearson. Cafeteria Workers did not involve private
property and rested upon national security considerations. Phillips,
on the other hand, dealt with the special case of the collection of
revenue and the use of administrative procedures. Despite these
differences, the Pearson Court could have extended the rationale of
these two cases and established new constitutional due process
standards applicable specifically to public benefit confiscations.1 1 5
Had it done so, it would have obviated the need for governments
to argue that their seizures fell within the Fuentes "extraordinary
situations" exception.
The Pearson majority declined to adopt such a specific rule,
however, and chose to retain the Fuentes framework. Yet Pearson
emasculated that case by making the "extraordinary situations"
exception very broad and flexible. The instant case, therefore, read
in conjunction with Mitchell and other recent decisions," 6 suggests
that the Supreme Court will henceforth take a much more tolerant
view of summary proceedings. Such a trend, of course, will substantially reduce the scope of procedural due process. How far the
Court will go remains to be seen; but after Pearson, the direction
17
seems clear.'
deficiency against a stockholder of a dissolved corporation for the company's back taxes. The
Supreme Court determined that the fifth amendment did not prohibit the government from
collecting revenue before a final judicial determination of the taxpayer's liability.
114 Id.

at 596-97.
115 The United States suggested a similar argument. See Brief for United States as

Amicus Curiae at 15-17, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
1" See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). lnArnett a federal employee in the
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) was dismissed for allegedly making "recklessly false
and defamatory statements" about his fellow workers. Id. at 137. The Supreme Court held
that the OEO and Civil Service Commission post-termination hearing procedures satisfied
fifth amendment due process requirements. See Freund, supra note 109, at 83-90.
117 In Fusari v. Steinberg, 95 S. Ct. 533 (1975), the Supreme Court had an opportunity
to consider the impact of Pearson on procedures for the termination of state unemployment
compensation benefits. Connecticut's "seated interview" system allowed the state to cease
payments to a recipient without a prior hearing other than an interview at the time of the
denial of payments. The district court found that these procedures did not provide "minimal
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution" and, therefore, enjoined
the state from denying benefits without "a constitutionally sufficient prior hearing." Steinberg v. Fusari, 364 F. Supp. 922, 938 (D. Conn. 1973).
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case. The opinion stated that "the possible length of wrongful deprivation" of
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CONCLUSION

Pearson -affirmed once again the state's traditional right to
confiscate the property of its citizens. In this respect, it is just the
most recent case in a line of decisions which goes back more than a
hundred years. But as history has shown, the antiquity of the
principle of forfeiture has not insulated it from constitutional
attack. On the contrary, law-abiding individuals have continually
complained of the injustices frequently wrought by forfeiture statutes.
The confiscation of innocent people's property is in fact a
punishment, despite whatever legal fictions judges may rely upon
to suggest that it is not. As the Supreme Court observed in Coin and
Currency, "there is no difference between a man who 'forfeits'
$8,674 . . . and a man who pays a 'criminal fine' of $8,674 as a
result of the same course of conduct .
*."..-As long as society
believes that punishment should not be inflicted upon the blameless, forfeiture enactments will be challenged. Pearson, therefore,
cannot be the last word on this subject.
Gordon Chang
benefits is "a significant factor in assessing the sufficiency of the entire process." 95 S. Ct. at
540. The Court remanded the case to the district court for a consideration of the effect of
new state procedures designed to shorten the appeals process, and thereby reduce the
period during which benefits are withheld. The assessment of the effect of Pearson,
therefore, must await a future decision of the Court. See also Crow v. California Dep't of
Human Resources Dev., 490 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1110 (1975).
I'l 402 U.S. at 718.

